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The degree of democracy is an important factor determining a country’s welfare through the 
formation of policies and the government’s priorities. This study explores in a quantitative 
framework the effect of democracy on total public spending, public educational, public health care 
and public military spending in the Post-Soviet states with the aim to contribute with new input and 
understanding and to test whether previous findings hold for the Post-Soviet context. The 
quantitative results are then further tested in a case study on Belarus and the Kyrgyz Republic. In line 
with predictions a positive relationship between democracy and public spending is found in the 
region. The study shows no significant relationship between educational and health care spending 
and democracy. Contradicting previous research a positive relationship between democracy and 
military spending is found, where an increase in degree of democracy leads to higher military 
spending. 
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1. Introduction 
A country’s degree of democracy is one way to determine the citizens’ possibilities to affect the 
public policies and decisions in a country and through that the priorities of the government. These 
priorities are then manifested through both the size and composition of public spending. Public 
spending in turn affects the welfare of the population, through for example the citizens’ access to 
education and health care. The relationship between democracy and public spending is therefore 
relevant to study to understand whether and how different regime types prioritize their spending 
differently. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Post-Soviet states have become an interesting sample to 
analyse. For centuries they shared a political and economic leadership until they in 1991, with the 
end of the Soviet era and command economy, faced a common shock and dramatically diverged 
differently. This shock forced the states to form their own states and transform their economies. 
During the over 20 years since then, these 15 states have evolved in different directions when it 
comes to regime type and are therefore relevant and interesting for a cross-country study. By 
reviewing the literature in this field, it is also clear that there is a lack of studies focusing on the 
specific link between democracy and public spending in the Post-Soviet states, especially during the 
recent decade, and there is therefore a need to study this region in a longer perspective. 
The aim of this study is to contribute with new input to the existing research and to test whether the 
previous findings of the relationship between democracy and public spending hold for the Post-
Soviet context. To achieve this purpose the following questions will be answered: 
 Can the Post-Soviet states’ variation in total public spending be explained by the variation in 
degree of democracy? 
 Can the Post-Soviet states’ variation in the composition of the public spending be explained 
by the variation in degree of democracy? 
By answering the first question it will become clear whether the amount of public spending varies 
with regime type, while the second question focuses on the priorities of public spending between 
regime types. The second question is a good complement to a better understanding of the welfare 
priorities. It is however important to note that spending measurements are no guarantee for better 
outputs. Due to limitations, and the complexity of quality measures, this study will look into the 
variation of public spending and the allocation as indicators of the priorities by the governments. 
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A key prediction, based on the theoretical background and previous research, is that democratization 
positively affects both total public, educational and health care spending, and negatively affects 
military spending. The intuition behind this hypothesis is that democratic societies need to prioritize 
human capital and the majority of the population’s interest in order to be re-elected, whereas 
autocratic societies can favour a small elite and still keep power. 
A literature overview will first be introduced where previous research on Post-Soviet states and the 
relationship between regime type and public spending are reviewed. Then follows section two with 
theoretical considerations discussing the mechanisms behind democracy and public spending. 
Section three gives the methodological background and a data overview, while section four describes 
the situation for the Post-Soviet states both prior to and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Section five defines the empirical strategy and presents and analyses the results from the 
models and the case study where the two countries facing the largest democratic shift during the 
studied period, Belarus and the Kyrgyz Republic, are analysed. Finally some concluding remarks wrap 
up the discussions of this paper. 
 Literature Overview 1.1.
Here follows an overview of previous research relevant for this study, both on Post-Soviet states as 
well as on the relation between political factors and public spending and its composition in general. 
 Previous Research on Post-Soviet States 1.1.1.
Previous studies on welfare systems in Post-Soviet countries often focus on one single component of 
public spending and are usually based either on case studies or a comparison of very few countries 
over the first ten years (see for example Cook 2007, Kornai and McHale 2000, and Orenstein 2000). 
The literature on post-communist transformations often implies that there have been changes in the 
governments’ spending patterns since the dissolution. However, as most of these studies are based 
on single cases or very few countries it is hard to draw conclusions on whether these findings are due 
to unique or common patterns. It is therefore difficult to generalize the results. 
Careja and Emmeneggers’ (2009) study is one of few quantitative studies on Post-Soviet states and 
their public spending. They study the distribution of welfare spending in the post-communist states 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that either are members or have applied for membership to the 
European Union and find that left incumbency is positively correlated both with total public and 
social expenditures. Orenstein (2008) studies all post-communist states and finds that strong 
democratic institutions are positively related to higher social spending. 
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Due to the scarcity of previous studies on public spending generalizable on all Post-Soviet states, as 
well as scarcity in studies including the last decade, it is motivated to further study this over a longer 
period and it indicates a need for further understanding. 
 Previous Research on Regime Type and Public Spending 1.1.2.
When widening the horizon outside the Post-Soviet states, there is more literature addressing the 
interaction between democracy and variables related to public spending, both when it comes to the 
link between regime type and public spending, and the distribution of the spending. Many studies 
have focused on wealthy democracies (see for example Garrett and Mitchell 2001 and Hicks and 
Swank 1992), often due to the scarcity of data for non-democratic countries. In recent years, 
however, studies on less democratic and less developed countries, mainly in Latin America and 
Africa, have also been carried out (see for example Avelino et al. 2005 and Brown and Hunter 1999). 
Avelino et al. (2005), Brown and Hunter (1999) as well as Shelton (2007) find public spending to be 
strongly positively related to democracy, and that the effect of democracy increases over time. 
Brown and Hunter (1999) find autocracies’ to have a more sensitive output elasticity when it comes 
to economic constraints, such as decreasing levels of per-capita income or negative growth rates. 
With economic constraints, authoritarian regimes will reduce the public spending at a faster rate 
than democracies and when economic constrains diminish, they will increase spending at a faster 
rate. By contrast they find that democracies’ output elasticity is more sensitive to political 
constraints, for example to changes in the demography of the electorate.  
Nelson (2007) argues that democracy tend to encourage public spending, but emphasizes that 
democracy’s both negative and positive effects on public spending and argues that this depends on 
which off the effects that dominate. Mulligan et al. (2004) operationalize democracy by fair voting 
and find no effect on educational spending or pension, concluding that democratic regime type has 
little effect on the extent of public spending. Also Mulligan et al. (2010) finds political factors to have 
partial impact on the size and allocation of public spending and emphasize growing incomes and 
demographic factors as explanatory variables of changes in social policy. 
Research has also concentrated on the allocation of public spending between different components 
of the public sector such as public educational, public health and public military spending (from now 
on educational spending, health care spending and military spending). Avelino et al. (2005) find that 
democracies increase educational spending and argue that democracies increase spending on sectors 
strengthening the human capital to improve efficiency. Brown and Hunter (2004), Kaufman and 
Segura (2001) and Stasavage (2005) also find that democracy affects educational spending positively, 
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where the strongest relationship holds for primary school. When it comes to spending on health the 
results are contradicting each other, where Avelino et al. (2005) find no positive relationship 
between democracy and health care spending, while others find a positive relationship (see for 
example Ghoborah et al. 2000 and Kaufman and Segura 2001). Rudra and Haggards’ (2001) findings 
show that authoritarian regimes are more likely to cut education and health care spending than 
democratic regimes. They argue that this is due to globalization pressure on democracies, where 
mainly trade and capital are determinants. The effect of democracy on military spending is by most 
researchers found to be negative. Both Dunne et al. (2008), Nordhaus et al. (2012) and Yildrim and 
Sezgin (2005) conclude that there is a negative relationship between military spending and 
democracy, and thus that autocracies spend more on their armies than democracies. 
Other research explains the relationship between public spending and democracy by the electoral 
business cycle and similar models. This theory considers political factors to be important, but focuses 
on the pressure from the voters during a period prior to democratic elections. (see for example Blais 
and Nadeau 1992, Brender and Drazen 2012, Chauvet and Collier 2009 and Katsimi and· Sarantides 
2009). Another area of focus has been to differentiate between ideology, where Huber et al. (2004) 
find left parties to focus more on health and education while right parties focus on social security. 
It is striking that almost all of the studies reach similar findings when it comes to the general link 
between democracy and public spending, where a vast majority find that democracy is associated 
with relatively higher public spending, even after introducing control variables. This effect is shown 
to increase over time and that democracies face a more sensitive output elasticity. Many do suggest 
differences in allocation, where most of them agree that democracies have a special interest in 
education and spend less on military, while the results are contradicting when it comes to health care 
spending. Some researchers argue that this is due to democracies being more prone to prioritize 
human capital and the majority citizens. There could be other transitional regions with similar 
political and economic context, such as some African or Latin American countries. However, as most 
studies are on the entire sample of OECD, South American or African countries it is difficult to apply 
the results on the Post-Soviet context and this study therefore attempts to complement these. 
2. Theoretical Consideration 
The structure of public spending is complicated and there are many different contexts and factors 
affecting it. For example do historical, demographic and geographic contexts have an impact. Today, 
no single theory covers the formation of public spending comprehensively, especially when it comes 
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to the link between regime type and public spending. This section therefore considers different 
theories that are believed to concern the particular relationship between the degree of democracy 
and public spending. 
A government’s total public spending consist of interest payments on the public debt (    ) plus all 
other public spending (  ), and are constrained by the size of its tax revenue (  ), the change in stock 
of government debt (   ) and the change in the money stock (   ):  
                   
(Olsson 2012 p.115). Hence, if a government increases either the tax revenue, its debt or its money 
supply, the total public spending will increase. At the same time, if debts are increased, the interest 
payments will constrain the government’s possibilities of other public spending. 
An important factor determining the tax revenue is a country’s fiscal and legal capacity, which 
enables governments to tax its citizens (Olsson 2012 p. 123). The tax revenue could therefore be 
expected to vary with democracy where the population in a more democratic country has a higher 
trust in the government and therefore is more willing to pay taxes. A democracy may also have more 
functional institutions to regulate taxation and the tax base. The tax rate is also an important factor 
determining the tax revenue. To heavily increase the tax rate could lead to tax avoidance and evasion 
in open economies (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1984 p. 358-359). At the same time the risk of losing 
re-elections due to high tax elasticity and unpopular decisions are greater risks for democracies. This 
fits well with Brown and Hunters’ (1999) argument that autocracies have less sensitive output 
elasticity when it comes to economic constraints. 
Following this discussion, democracies could be expected to have higher tax revenues, hence less 
constraints on public spending, but will not be able to increase the tax rate at the same speed as 
autocracies. How large the actual tax revenues are will be determined by both the tax rate and the 
willingness to pay taxes, depending on which effect is largest. The definition of public spending used 
in this study includes interest payments, though the relationship between public debt and regime 
type is not directly studied it could be seen as mirrored by the relative size of the spending on 
education, health care and military. Changes in the money stock are left out of this discussion, as 
monetary policy often is run by independent institutions in democracies and is not included in the 
public spending measure. In accordance with previous studies the size of public spending could also 
be affected by different short-run factors, for example the election cycle, exogenous economic 
factors and changes in ruling party ideology. In the short-run the tax revenue constrains the 
government’s spending less than in the long-run as the government will need to carry out a 
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sustainable fiscal policy with a balanced budget in the longer run, but are more able to spend beyond 
their means in the short-run (Olsson 2012 p. 116, 119). 
In a democratic state the government needs to constructs its public sector on demand from a 
majority of its citizens. Democracies need to gain the public’s support before any major action and 
have thus internal checks and balances that hold the leaders responsible. This implies that a 
democracy has to invest in a majority of the population, while an autocracy can limit its spending to 
favour the elite, which in turn suggests that democracies have a greater overall public spending, 
ceteris paribus. Since the populations in democracies will claim participation in the political system, 
the majority’s economic interest and needs will be prioritized (Karvonen 2008 p. 89). Health and 
education are therefore expected to be more prioritized in democratic societies than in autocratic. 
This is in line with Avelino et al.’s (2005) findings that democracies invest more in human capital. The 
opposite holds for military spending, which does not give any value to the majority citizen but could 
be expected to favour the ruling elite. 
3. Research Design 
To meet the purpose of the study and to answer the research questions, a quantitative study in a 
panel-data setting will be conducted, studying the variation in public spending over time. The 
analysis includes annual data on public spending for all 15 Post-Soviet states between 1991 and 2011 
in all cases where reliable data is available (see table 1 for an overview of the data). This method 
gives the opportunity to study the effect of changes in degree of democracy on the public spending 
over a long-run perspective in the Post-Soviet countries and simplifies the procedure of drawing 
conclusions and assuring statistical cogency. To complement the quantitative approach, two 
countries will be specifically analysed to help explain the mechanisms behind the relationship for the 
two studied countries. 
 Measurement and Operationalization 3.1.
The following section operationalizes and defines the necessary terms, tools and measurements to 
answer the research questions presented in the introduction (see Appendix 1 for an overview of the 
measurements). 
To operationalize public spending the widely recognized World Bank expense measure (2013:1) will 
be used, which includes “all cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing 
goods and services”, as a per cent of GDP. This measure is used with the aim to understand the 
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structure of the economy, rather than the size of it. Using absolute numbers would cause misleading 
results when comparing economies of different size. 
As illustrated in the literature overview, previous studies have used education, health care and 
military spending as public spending components when studying the relation between democracy 
and the composition of public spending. Since the aim of this study is to contribute to the knowledge 
gap and test if previous findings also hold for the Post-Soviet states, these variables will here 
constitute the measurement of the composition of public spending. Health and education are 
variables that are argued to boost the human capital, while military spending could be argued to 
favour a smaller ruling elite, why they are interesting to include to contrast each other. These three 
variables are not claimed to explain the whole composition of public spending but to be to be a 
relevant selection to understand the broader picture. When studying the composition of public 
spending it is interesting to understand how much of the total public spending is spent on education, 
health and military. Therefore these variables are measured as a per cent of public spending rather 
than of GDP, based on the same argument as before for using per cent rather than absolute 
numbers. 
The educational spending includes current and capital government spending on educational 
administration, institutions, and subsidies and transfers for private entities (UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics 2013). The public health care spending comprises of social health insurance funds, central 
and local government recurrent and capital spending, as well as external borrowing and grants 
related to the health system (World Health Organization 2013). The military spending encompasses 
all payments to armed forces, defence ministries and other relevant government agencies and 
personnel as well as military aid (The World Bank 2013:2).  
The degree of democracy is here defined by the Polity IV project’s measure weighting among others 
presence of institutions, institutional power constraints, the guarantee of civil liberties and 
competitive political participation (Marshall et al. 2011 p. 14-16). This sums up different theoretical 
definitions of democratic degree and is therefore considered a wide and sustainable measure. 
 The Data  3.2.
This study uses annual time-series cross-sectional data on a matrix containing 15 countries studied 
over 20 years. The data is collected from different sources; the general public and military spending 
data is collected from the World Bank (2013:4), the democratic estimations from the Center for 
Systemic Peace (2012), the educational spending data is from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(2013) and the health and military expenditure data is from the World Health Organization (2013). 
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Both the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, the World Health Organization and the World Bank provide 
internationally comparable annual statistics collected from national official administrations and 
publicly available reports. According to the World Bank (2013:2) the definition of military spending 
comes with limitations since all governments are not transparent with what is included in their 
military account, but the measure is still considered to be the best available. The Polity IV estimations 
for assessing regime type and effects of authoritarian regimes is widely used, and scrutinized, by 
researchers. The Polity IV project provides annual valuations of changes in regimes and authority 
characteristics. The data set is also annually re-examined and regularly revised when new 
information arises to eliminate problems with for example subjectivity. This study uses the Polity2 
measure of democracy as it is technically modified to range between -10 and +10 to facilitate panel 
data analyses (Marshall et al 2011 p. 3-8, 17). 
Table 1: Overview of data on public, educational, health care and military 
spending (in per cent) 
  Public Education  Health care Military 
Country Mean N Std Mean N Std Mean N Std Mean N Std 
Ukraine 33.5 13 5.1 17.7 10 2.4 9.1 16 0.5 8.9 12 0.6 
Moldova 30.9 13 4.9 20.5 13 2.3 11.8 16 1.7 1.6 13 0.1 
Estonia 30.2 16 3.3 14.6 10 0.6 12.0 16 1.3 5.3 16 0.4 
Lithuania 30.1 11 4.1 14.7 9 1.3 12.1 16 1.4 5.1 11 0.4 
Latvia 29.1 17 2.7 14.5 9 1.1 9.8 16 0.8 4.3 17 0.4 
Russian Federation 23.4 9 3.6 11.7 6 0.8 10.8 16 1.7 17.0 9 0.7 
Belarus 21.3 19 3.2 15.6 7 3.2 9.3 16 1.3 5.4 17 0.4 
Armenia 19.5 9 2.8 13.1 11 1.4 7.0 16 0.9 17.0 8 0.3 
Kyrgyz Republic 19.2 13 2.9 22.7 13 1.9 12.6 16 1.7 16.8 12 0.8 
Georgia 18.3 15 6.7 10.1 12 1.8 6.8 16 3.0 15.0 14 2.8 
Azerbaijan 16.9 3 1.6 17.3 13 5.4 4.4 16 1.2 18.7 3 1.7 
Kazakhstan 15.2 14 1.8 13.3 2 1.2 10.5 16 2.2 6.9 14 0.3 
Tajikistan 10.8 6 1.6 16.7 10 2.1 6.3 16 1.1 15.1 6 1.1 
Turkmenistan . 0 . . 0 . 12.0 16 1.8 . 0 . 
Uzbekistan . 0 . 22.8 1 0.0 7.2 16 0.7 . 0 . 
Notes: Public spending is measured as a per cent of GDP, while education, health care and military spending are measured 
as a per cent of public spending for the years 1991-2011. Descending by mean public spending. The public and military 
spending data is collected from The World Bank (2013:4), the educational data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2013) 
and the health care data from the World Health Organization (2013). 
When using secondary data there is always the question of credibility, as it is impossible to influence 
the data collection process. There are also inherent limitations in the data available. Governments 
often construct their own figures, why there is a risk of them being biased. This limitation is hard to 
avoid and as all four data sources are common within research and present methodologies and 
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sources transparently, the data used is still considered to be the most reliable comparable data 
available. 
That the Post-Soviet sample includes autocracies leads to scarce data in some cases. With restrictions 
on access to public data and often unstable situations, some states have had problems to report 
annual figures some years as is presented in table 1. 
In this study there is a total lack of public and military spending data for Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan and of educational data for Turkmenistan. In the education dataset there is no available 
data prior to 1995, except for Belarus and Latvia. The lack of data could be explained by the very 
unstable situation during the first years and is a common problem one has to deal with when 
studying transitional regimes. This study is however still justified as there is a need for a quantitative 
study on the Post-Soviet states and as there is available data for most countries. When analysing the 
final results, this limitation has to be taken into consideration. 
4. Description of the Post-Soviet Sample  
This study consists of a total sample where all Post-Soviet states are included. This means that the 
results will give a good understanding of this regional context. Following is a brief overview of the 
regional democratic and public spending context in the Post-Soviet states, both before the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the development since then. 
 Context prior to 1991 4.1.
The Soviet Union was governed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a single-party state 
with a highly centralized government and economy. Power was mainly located in Moscow and the 
Communist Party was the ultimate policy maker and the only legal party available. There was wide 
political repression and persecution of enemies of the Soviet system and elections were held mainly 
to manifest the power of the Communist Party (see for example Cooper 1994, McCauley 2008 and 
Schapiro 1977). The leadership was thus strongly autocratic until the late 1980’s when reform 
attempts were made, which slowly started to move the union in a more democratic direction (Center 
for Systemic Peace 2012).  
The Soviet economy was characterized by a centralized command economy where the state owned 
almost all productive assets and used a non-market system of resource allocation, as well as a black 
market that grew very large. This resulted in heavily distorted prices, that services and 
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communications became underdeveloped and that the agricultural sector grew very large. The 
industries in the Soviet Union were mainly large-scale and labour-intensive and focused primarily on 
armaments, traditional materials, fuel and energy. The location of the industries as well as the 
division of labour was decided by the central authorities with the result that the different republics 
heavily specialized in different sectors, irrespective whether they had comparative advantages or 
not. Some countries therefore faced a hard time downscaling and adapting to market forces after the 
dissolution (see for example Cooper 1994 p. 454-455 McCauley 2008 p. 440-442 and Schapiro 1977 
p. 161). 
In the Soviet Union public spending accounted for around 60 per cent of GDP and both health care 
and education was free and aimed at being available for everyone (see for example Mironov 1991 
and Rowland and Telyokov 1991). The central government in the Soviet Union put great emphasis on 
education and established a broad network of primary schools, resulting in almost universal literacy 
already in 1950 (Mironov 1991 p. 247, 251). In 1989 health care expenditures accounted for 5.1 per 
cent of budgetary outlays in the Soviet Union and were financed through the central government 
budget where the ministry controlled all facilities and financial resources. This resulted in an unequal 
supply of health care where for example Georgia had twice as many physicians per capita than 
Tajikistan. The health care supplied large quantities but often poorly maintained facilities, low-paid 
personnel, bad water management and insufficient supplies (Rowland and Telyukov 1991 p. 75-81), 
indicating that many states started with poor preconditions for health care once independent. With 
the arms race during the Cold War military spending in the Soviet Union became extremely high, 
which was paralyzing for the Soviet economy. The military budget did however decrease somewhat 
when Gorbachev came into power shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union (McCauley 2008 
p. 443). 
 Context following 1991 4.2.
During the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Baltic States experienced a relatively smooth transition 
towards democracy with the formation of opposition parties, functioning electoral systems, and 
constitutional change to decrease the power of the president. The democratic transition was 
different for many of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), i.e. all Post-Soviet states 
except the Baltics and Georgia, where old communist elites could persist until the dissolution and 
anti-communist opposition was too weak to alter the power relations in a sustaining way. The 
constitutions were thus often heavily influenced by these elites rather than by democratically elected 
parliaments. In most central Asian countries the old communist elite managed to control all power 
resources and elect the first secretaries of the republican communist parties into autocratic 
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presidents (see for example Dabrowski and Gorat 2002 p. 15-20, 25 and The World Bank 2002 p. 99-
100). This is also reflected by the Center for Systemic Peace (2012) in Graph 1, which displays the 
large differences and fluctuations in democracy among the studied countries. 
Graph 1: Democracy index for the Post-Soviet states 1991-2011 
  
Note: Democracy is measured on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) based on data from the 
Center for Systemic Peace (2012). The sample includes the Post-Soviet states and ranges from the end of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 until 2011. 
The most negative democratic trend in this sample is Belarus who, since Lukashenko came into 
power in 1994, has created a constitutional autocracy. He instituted presidential rule and introduced 
restrictions on freedom of the press and speech, which could help to explain the major fall in degree 
of democracy (Freedom House 1998). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Belarus initiated 
capitalist reforms by for example privatising public firms, but with Lukashenko’s entry on the political 
scene command economy was reintroduced. Since 1999 Belarus has a two-state union treaty with 
the Russian Federation and has developed great political and economic integration (CIA 2013:2). 
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the late 1990’s before the president was overthrown and more democratic institutions came back 
into practice (CIA 2013:1).  
The largest positive democratic fluctuations occurred in the Kyrgyz Republic, which was governed by 
an authoritarian president from independence until 2005 when the country started a more 
democratic executive recruitment process (Center for Systemic Peace 2010:2). Following 2005, the 
Kyrgyz Republic did still not develop into an electoral democracy and corruption was common, but 
the change of leader after 14 years and the relative respect of freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion can explain the positive democratic development (Freedom House 2008). After 
independence extensive land market reforms were carried out to abandon command economy and 
the years following 2005 the Kyrgyz government managed to balance the economy to control its 
deficits (CIA 2013:4). 
When the Soviet Union transformed into independent countries the Post-Soviet states were left with 
different comparative advantages of production, where some countries possessed larger assets of 
natural resources. All countries experienced a drop in total output and especially the CIS countries 
faced a dramatic output decline in the first six years of independence. With continuous market 
reforms and the recovery of the first transition, most of the Post-Soviet states reached a positive 
growth around 1997 (The World Bank 2002 p. 3), though in 2012 the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Ukraine had not yet recovered properly and where still facing a GDP per capita smaller 
than in 1991 (The World Bank 2013:4). The transformation to market economy resulted in less fiscal 
control, the need to stabilize high inflation, unsustainable public debt in several countries and in 
addition a decline in total output, which resulted in heavily decreased spending on education and 
health care. The cuts in education lead to decreased quality with a lack of access to school supplies 
and some countries have even failed to provide resources for basic education to all its citizens (The 
World Bank 2002 p. 81-85). After the dissolution the health care systems has also evolved in different 
directions and many countries are struggling to provide adequate health care to its citizens. This has 
led to underpaid personnel and the fact that many poor families cannot afford treatment (The World 
Bank 2002 p. 86-87). The increased income inequalities were, according Careja and Emmenegger 
(2007), largely explained by the little attention put on social aspects of transformation. Urban areas 
are, according to the World Bank (2002 p. 84), often prioritized over rural areas. 
As illustrated earlier in table 1 the countries geographically close to the European Union have a 
significantly higher public spending than the Central Asian countries, who on the other hand have a 
higher share of military spending to public spending. It is also observed that all countries have 
decreased their public spending since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Interesting to note is that 
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despite the difficulties to recover economically Moldova and Ukraine have the highest public 
spending as a share of GDP. In Estonia, Belarus and Lithuania the governments account for more than 
seventy per cent of all health care expenditures in the countries, whereas in Tajikistan, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan the public expenditures are around 25 per cent of the total, and the population thus 
needs to rely more on private alternatives (The World Bank 2013:4). Currently the Baltic States are 
full members of NATO and both Georgia and Ukraine have applied for memberships and have been 
accepted for further discussions (NATO 2012 and 2013). These countries, except for Georgia in 2007-
2008, show relatively small military spending compared to among others the Russian Federation, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic (The World Bank 2013:4). That Armenia is still 
technically at war with Azerbaijan and Turkey helps explaining their relatively large military sectors 
(CIA 2013:1), while Georgia’s large military sector is mainly explained by the accumulation of military 
spending around the five-day war with Russia in 2008 (CIA 2013:3) 
5. Empirical Analysis 
This section will present the hypothesis, the econometric set-up and thus the basis for the empirical 
study, as well as the results. 
 Empirical Strategy 5.1.
The basic equations to be estimated are: 
                              
                                    
where    is a constant parameter, democracy is the Polity IV estimate lagged one year and      is the 
error term. The estimations are run with robust standard errors and fixed effect-estimation (FE-
estimation) (   is country fixed effects and    is time fixed effects), to control for cross-country 
variations and differences caused by the path of time. Public spending is the dependent variable of 
interest,      when answering the first research question, while education, health care and military 
spending respectively are the variables of interests when studying the composition of public 
spending. 
The public spending variable is, based on findings in previous research, expected to be positively 
related to a change in degree of democracy, i.e.     . When analyzing the composition of public 
spending, both health care and educational spending are expected to be positively related to a 
change in regime type,     , supported in the argument that democracies need to invest more in 
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its citizens. Military spending on the other hand is predicted to have a negative correlation to 
democracy change,     , which has been the case in studies on other regions. 
First, univariate regressions including lagged democracy are carried out to test the basic relationships 
in model 1. Any other explanatory variable that affect public spending is here captured in the error 
term. The independent variable is expected to be lagged democracy, as it is predicted that public 
economic policies follow democratic development. If lagged democracy is correlated to public 
spending the conclusion that the causality is running from democracy to public spending becomes 
more confident. One-year lag is considered most relevant in this study because least observations 
are dropped and to lag more years render very similar results (see Appendix 2).  
In the models following the univariate regressions time and country fixed effects are included. The 
FE-estimators are used to control for country-specific and time invariant characteristics as time-
invariant omitted variables are presumed (models 2 to 4). When controlling for only time fixed 
effects the differences in level of public spending dependent on degree of democracy are 
determined. Whereas when controlling for both time and country fixed effects the variation in 
democracy’s effect on public spending is measured. Since the data set was not randomly selected, 
individual differences are treated as fixed rather than random (Angrist and Pischke 2009 p.223, 243). 
Squared lagged democracy is also included in the models to test for nonlinearity (model 5). 
Because this is a time-series-cross-sectional analysis there may be a problem with autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity, and thus the standard errors may be misleading (Hill et al. 2012 p. 298). To 
control for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used. To deal with autocorrelation time 
fixed effects are used and due to the risk of high correlation, and thus a risk of multicollinearity, no 
control variables will be added in these regressions. Country fixed effects control for heterogeneity. 
As time and country fixed effects are included most variations caused by external factors are 
expected to be tackled without impacting the degree of freedom. The aim of this study is not to 
compose a model that explains the full formation of public spending, but rather to analyse the 
relationship between public spending and democracy, and therefore FE estimations are considered 
to be an adequate method. The models do not attempt to fully explain the mechanisms behind 
public spending but to see whether democracy is one explanatory factor, why the level of R-square is 
considered less important. 
To deeper understand the mechanisms following a large change in regime type and to further test 
the results obtained in the regressions, a case study is conducted on the two countries, which have 
faced the largest shifts. As illustrated in graph 1, Belarus underwent a major drop in democracy after 
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1994, while the Kyrgyz Republic increased its democracy with seven units following 2004. Armenia is 
left out of the case study even though it faced a major drop. This is done because the country 
recovered again after one year and is therefore not a suitable case when studying the impact of a 
change in democracy (Center for Systemic Peace 2012). The years selected for the case study are the 
year of the major change and the four following years. As this paper argues that changes in public 
spending due to a changed democratic set-up is lagged, the year when the democratic shock 
occurred is therefore a good base line indicating the initial levels, and the four consecutive years are 
included to be sure to capture the full effect. The case study will mainly be statistical as the aim of 
the case study is to particularly study the two extreme changes and the effects following. The results 
in the case study will not be generalizable nor explain the whole country specific contexts, but will 
further test and illustrate the regression results. 
 Empirical Results 5.2.
The aim of this study is to test the relationship between democracy and public spending in a Post-
Soviet context. The main results suggest, in accordance with the predictions, a positive relationship 
between variation in democracy and public spending, no relationship with educational and health 
care spending and contradicting the predictions a positive relationship with military spending. 
Table 2: Democracy and public spending in the Post-Soviet states1 
 Public spending 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Democracy (t-1) -0.029 0.292 -0.050 0.151* 0.132 
  (0.094 ) (0.253) (0.055) (0.084 ) (0.100) 
    
   
  
Democracy (t-1)^2   




   
(0.027) 
    
   
  
Country fixed effect no yes no yes yes 
Time fixed effect no no yes yes yes 
    
   
  
Constant 25.176***  24.874*** 25.196*** 11.861*** 8.755*** 
  (0.632)  (0.238) (0.052 ) (1.351) (1.629) 
   1 
   
  
R-square 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.734 0.739 
    
   
  
N  154 154 154 154 154 
Notes: Public spending is measured as a per cent of GDP (World Bank 2013:4) while democracy, lagged democracy and 
squared lagged democracy is measured on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) based on data 
from the Center for Systemic Peace (2012). Time period of the sample is 1991-2011. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
                                                          
1 See appendix 1a for a correlation chart and Appendix 3 for regressions including the variables democracy (t), democracy 
(t-2) and democracy (t-3). 
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In line with the predictions, the positive democracy coefficient shows that an increase in democracy 
leads to a higher public spending ratio to GDP, consistent with previous studies. It is first when 
controlling for both time and country fixed effects that the explanatory variable becomes significant, 
there is thus underlying time and country specific influence in the first regression. One unit increase 
in democracy level leads to a 15 per cent increase in the public spending ratio the following year in 
the Post-Soviet states, when controlling for fixed effects. When controlling for nonlinearity, it is 
found that there is a positive quadratic relationship. The relationship has thus a parabolic shape with 
a stronger impact the more or less democratic the country is.  
The strongly positive relationship, indicating that a shift in a country’s degree of democracy from -10 
(strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) increases public spending by 300 per cent, might be 
overestimated. One explanation for the overestimation might be interactions with other variables 
adding up the effect explained by change in democracy. This explanation is supported by the 
regressions including control variables (see appendix 4) as the estimated effect that democracy has 
on public spending increases when including control variables. It is however difficult to state which 
other variables might bias the lagged democracy and the extent of the bias. Another explanation 
could be non-linearity in the sample or that the relationship is linear around the centre but not on 
the extremes. When also including squared lagged democracy (see appendix 3), the public spending 
regression gives a significant coefficient, indicating that there is a non-linear relationship which 
implies that the relationship is at least squared. This study still claims a positive relationship between 
democracy and total public spending as both the regression including fixed effects and the regression 
including control variables indicate a positive relationship, but does consider that there might be a 
bias in the magnitude of the coefficient. 
To further understand the nuances of public spending and elaborate on the priorities by the 
governments, the same regressions are also ran on educational, health care and military spending. 
All three univariate regressions in table 3 are significant, where health care and military spending 
displays relationships in line with the predictions, while educational spending is negatively related to 
variation in degree of democracy. Interestingly do democracies in this region however overall has a 
lower military spending as the coefficient is significantly negative in model 3.  
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Table 3: Democracy and the composition of public spending in the Post-Soviet states2 
 Educational spending Health care spending Military spending 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy (t-1) -0.125* 0.023 -0.111 0.153 0.104*** -0.029 0.108*** 0.039 -0.144* 0.574* -0.179*** 0.511*** 
  (0.070) (0.195) (0.073) (0.402) (0.026) (0.068) (0.017) (0.062) (0.077) (0.288) (0.056) (0.155) 
  
    
  
   
  
   Country fixed effect no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Time fixed effect no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes 
  
    
  
   
  
   Constant 16.361***  15.920*** 16.318*** 18.874*** 9.396 ***  9.523*** 9.392*** 10.385*** 9.580*** 7.103*** 9.702*** 5.343*** 
  (0.490) (0.581) (0.217) (2.174) (0.193)   (0.065) (0.016) (0.494) (0.561)  (0.995) (0.195) (0.397 ) 
  
        
  
   R-square 0.028  0.000 0.022 0.177 0.059 0.001 0.065 0.102 0.017  0.098 0.027 0.230 
  
    
  
   
  
   N 126  126 126 126 239  239 239 239 151  151 151 151 
Notes: Public spending is measured as a per cent of GDP (World Bank 2013:4) while educational spending (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2013), health care spending (World Health 
Organization 2013) and military spending (World Bank 2013:4) are measured as per cent of total public spending. Democracy is measured on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 
(strongly democratic) based on data from the Center for Systemic Peace (2012). Time period of the sample is 1991-2011. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * 
p < 0.1 
                                                          
2 See appendix 1a for a correlation chart and Appendix 3 for regressions including the variables democracy (t), democracy (t-1)^2, democracy (t-2) and democracy (t-3).  
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When controlling for both country and time fixed effects only military spending still displays a 
significant relationship, where a one unit increase in democracy increases military spending by 51 per 
cent. The strong positive impact of democracy on military spending is further enhanced by the 
positive relationship between democracy and total public spending. This result can be influenced by 
the fact that some of the democracies studied are in conflicts with neighbouring countries and hence 
may spend more on their military than a country in peace. Furthermore does the relatively 
democratic Russian Federation have high military spending, which could probably be explained by its 
attempt to power balance NATO. The strongly autocratic Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is lacking 
data. Also, the conflicts with neighbouring countries mentioned in section 4.2 are often more 
affected by historical and ethnic conflicts than the democratic factor. Health care spending as per 
cent of public spending is positive when only controlling for time fixed effects but not when 
controlling for both time and country fixed effects. This implies that democracies generally have a 
higher level of health care spending than autocracies, but that there is no impact when the degree of 
democracy changes. 
It is interesting that there is no difference in the public spending structure when it comes to 
education and health care between democracies and autocracies in the Post-Soviet states. This 
contradicts previous predictions and research, except from Avelino et al. (2005) who also find no 
relationship between health care spending and democracy. That there is no significant difference in 
educational and health care spending implies that a change in degree of democracy does not affect 
the share of public spending spent on human capital. 
When taking the positive relation of general public spending and democracy into account, it can 
however be concluded that even though the share of educational and health care spending is the 
same, democracies spend more overall. Thus are the absolute numbers spent on education and 
health care higher in democracies, which is in line with the other studies mentioned in the literature 
overview. It is also possible that there could be differences when analysing different levels of 
education, which Brown and Hunter (2004), Kaufman and Segura (2001) and Stasavage (2005) have 
found. This study, however, limits educational spending to the overall spending and is therefore not 
able to draw any further conclusions on this. When including control variables (see appendix 4) 
similar results occur, though it is interesting to note that the positive relationship between 
democracy and total public spending becomes even stronger when including control variables, 
indicating that there are other effects not controlled by the fixed effects impacting the result 
although the relationship stays positive. 
To conclude, the regression analysis displays a positive relationship between democracy and public 
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spending, as well as military spending. There was no relationship found when studying health care 
and educational expenditure, although democracies spend more in total on health care than 
autocracies. 
 Case Study of Belarus and the Kyrgyz Republic 5.2.3.
To further test the results and to better explain the mechanisms behind the relationship, a case study 
is here conducted. The selection of cases was therefore based on the two countries that have 
experienced the largest positive versus negative change in democracy to contrast each other, 
Belarus’ and the Kyrgyz Republic’s. These two countries are the two countries that have undergone 
the most dramatic changes in degree of democracy and are therefore the most suited cases to test 
the hypothesis further and foremost to better explain the mechanisms behind the relationships by 
comparing the outcomes. The case study is focusing on the short-run to see the immediate change of 
a democratic shock and to complement the quantitative analysis. 
Graph 2: Case study on democracy and public spending in Belarus and the 
Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Notes: Public spending is measured as a per cent of GDP (The World Bank 2013:4), while health care (World Health 
Organization 2013) and military spending (The World Bank 2013:4) are measured as a per cent of public spending. 
Educational spending for Kyrgyz Republic is as a per cent of public spending while for Belarus educational spending as per 
cent of GDP is used due to data availability (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2013). On the right hand side axis democracy is 
measured on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) based on data from the Center for Systemic 
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When studying the change of Belarus’ and the Kyrgyz Republic’s public spending and composition of 
public spending, one can observe a positive relationship between democracy and the different 
spending variables during the observed years. The scarce data in both cases needs to be considered 
when drawing conclusions. In the Belarus’ case all spending have decreased on average over the five 
years, indicating that the decrease in democracy has been followed by a decrease in public spending, 
while Kyrgyz Republic’s increased democracy has resulted in higher spending. That public, 
educational and health care spending increase with democracy is in line with the predictions and the 
results from previous research. However, in the previous regressions this relation was only revealed 
for total public spending. 
During the studied period, the Belarusian economy was characterized by a high degree of state 
ownership, close trade interdependency with the Russian Federation and prevention of the 
emergence of oligarchs (Wilson 2007 p. 105). As Belarus was one of the wealthiest states of the 
Soviet Union, the country had favourable preconditions once independent (The World Bank 2003 p. 
31). Between 1994-1996 GDP faced an annual negative growth of around -10 per cent, but then 
heavily recovered in 1996-1998 with a growth rate of around 10 per cent per year. A decrease in 
public spending as per cent of GDP could therefore also be an effect of an increased GDP. However, 
public spending in absolute numbers has decreased slightly over the studied period (The World Bank 
2013:4). A monetary expansion following 1994 resulted in a twice as high net domestic credit of the 
national bank in two years, due to a lack of external sources (Antczak et al. 2000 p. 10). Still, Belarus 
has comparatively low interest expenditures and thus a greater proportion of public spending 
available for other components (The World Bank 2003 p. 37). 
As command economy was re-established in Belarus with Lukashenko, an increased public sector 
could have been expected. The decrease in public spending following the decrease in democracy in 
Belarus could instead partly be explained by the tough economic conditions both domestically and in 
the Russian Federation. Due to the establishment of a tight economic and political relationship to the 
Russian Federation, Belarus was heavily affected by the Russian economic and financial crisis in 1998. 
Due to this, Belarus was forced to devaluate, which heavily increased prices and inflation, and hence 
reduced the trade with the Russian Federation and other CIS countries (Antczak et al. 2000 p. 6). As 
previous studies have shown, autocratic regimes are more inclined to decrease public spending when 
facing economic setbacks, while democracies face a more sensitive elasticity. 
The tax burden in Belarus was relatively high and complex compared to comparable countries, where 
the corporate income taxes dominated the levies on private persons due to a low income-level of the 
population (Antczak et al. 2000 p. 9-10). At the same time, the private sector was heavily subsidised 
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by the government (The World Bank 2003 p. 37). During 1994-1998, the tax revenues as per cent of 
GDP decreased by around 30 per cent (The World Bank 2013:4), constraining the possibilities of 
public spending. The high tax burden, but decreased tax revenues, could imply a declining willingness 
to pay taxes, a possible effect of decreasing democracy and thus trust in the government. However, 
due to scarce information on tax rates during this period, there could be other reasons for this. 
Both educational, health care and military spending show decreasing trends during the studied 
period in Belarus. The educational data is however very scarce and therefore hard to draw 
conclusions on. Education in Belarus was, and still is, free up until higher education (Belarus.by 2013). 
The enrolment rate in primary education increased during the studied period, contradicting the 
earlier predictions that autocracies spend less on human capital, while the pupil-teacher ratio was 
held constant (The World Bank 2013:4), indicating an increased number of teachers. This all suggests 
that the cost of education for the government increased during this period. Graph 2 implies that the 
share of GDP spent on education slightly decreased 1995-1996 but as GDP increased heavily during 
these years the effect of the change in democracy is hard to conclude. Despite command economy, 
the share of private to total health care increased. This could partly explain the decreased public 
health care spending, but other factors need to be considered, such as the aging population’s need 
for care (The World Bank 2013:4). The positive relationship between democracy and military 
spending contradicts the predictions, but is consistent with the results from the regressions. Belarus’ 
close relationship and military-integration process with the Russian Federation (Wilson 2007 p. 107) 
could be an explanatory factor to why Belarus managed to decrease the military spending since 
Lukashenko seized power. 
The Kyrgyz economy was, and still is, heavily dependent on gold exports and a majority of the labour 
force was located in the agricultural sector. The Kyrgyz Republic is a low-income country and one of 
the countries with worse comparative advantages and faced a hard time recovering after 1991 (CIA 
2013:4). After the dissolution, the government has managed to transform the economy into a 
liberalized market economy with over 70 per cent of the farmland privately owned and with a 
liberalized foreign trade regime (International Development Association 2009 p. 1). Since 2005 the 
government has engaged in a poverty reduction and economic growth strategy and succeeded in 
balancing the fiscal deficit in 2006 (CIA 2013:4). Despite not having recovered to the same GDP per 
capita since the dissolution, the Kyrgyz Republic experienced a heavy increase in GDP growth in 
2007-2008 due to the higher gold price internationally (The World Bank 2013:4 and CIA 2013:4). 
Overall during the studied years however, the GDP was kept relatively constant. 
There is scarce data on public spending for the studied years in the Kyrgyz Republic, but a slight 
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positive trend can be observed. During this period the per cent of public spending spent on interest 
payments on public debt has decreased significantly (The World Bank 2013:4), while government 
debt was kept almost constant (Mogilevsky and Omorova 2011 p. 15), indicating a larger share 
available for other components of public spending. At the same time the tax revenues and inflation 
increased during the same period (The World Bank 2013:4), which could help explain the increased 
public spending and imply that the money spent was put on other components than interest 
payment. 
Despite of a relatively high educational spending, the Kyrgyz school system displayed relatively poor 
results (Hou 2011 p.1). During the studied period, spending on tertiary education per student was 
reduced, contradicting the predictions that democracies spend more on human capital. Similarly as 
for Belarus, the enrolment rate in primary education was increased while the pupil-teacher ratio was 
held constant, indicating higher educational spending, ceteris paribus. Following a massive 
privatization of health care, the system was once again nationalized after the positive shift in 
democracy, which could imply an increase in health care spending. Demographically the dependency 
ratio has decreased (The World Bank 2013:4), which could indicate lower health care spending and 
overall contributing to explaining why only a small positive relationship is observed. In the Kyrgyz 
Republic case, the change in military spending is almost negligible as it recovers fast and the data is 
scarce. Still, it is relatively high compared to Belarus. With internal ethnic conflicts, weaker 
relationship to the Russian Federation during the studied period compared to Belarus (CIA 2013:4) 
and with no membership in NATO, the predictions indicate that these factors could explain the 
relatively high military spending. 
This case study has analysed the mechanisms behind the relationship between democracy and public 
spending, focusing on the short-run changes following major shifts in democracy. The results imply 
that both Belarus and the Kyrgyz Republic have, despite both evolving from the Soviet Union, very 
different economic premises. Belarus came out as one of the wealthiest countries after the 
dissolution, while the Kyrgyz Republic still struggles as a low-income country. Even though the public 
spending has decreased over the studied period Belarus still spent almost twice as large share of GDP 
on public spending than the Kyrgyz Republic, something that could partly be explained by the 
relatively high degree of state ownership in Belarus. The great public spending and the government 
control of the market could be an effect of the low degree of democracy. With autocratic regimes, 
the government is more prone to manifest its power and favour the elite by controlling a large part 
of the market. 
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 Comparison of the Results 5.3.
Overall, the case study displays similar results as the regressions. When it comes to public and 
military spending there is a positive relationship both in the regressions and the case study. The case 
study displays a slight positive relationship between educational and health care spending and 
democracy, while the regressions show no significant differences. One explanation to this could be 
that in the short-run the government can have a budgetary deficit while in the long-run they need to 
balance the budget and are therefore more constrained to changes. The larger change in spending in 
the short-run is thus in line with the theoretical considerations. 
The regression results in table 2 reveal a significantly positive parabolic relationship between 
democracy and public spending in the region. The result in the case study confirms this and is in line 
with previous research. However, robust conclusions in the Kyrgyz case cannot be drawn upon due to 
scarce data. This strengthens the theoretical predictions that democracies tend to prioritize the 
majority of the citizens and hence spend more when democratized. Another reason for this could be 
that democratization often leads to better legislations and institutions, enabling better tools for 
collecting tax and through its higher credibility face a greater willingness to pay tax. This in turn leads 
to higher tax revenues and eases the budget constraint on public spending. It is interesting to note 
that both the short-run case study and the regressions illustrate a positive relationship between 
democracy and public spending. 
The theory predicts that democracies tend to allocate more resources to strengthen human capital, 
but this is not confirmed by the regression results. They instead show no significant differences 
between democracies and autocracies when the degree of democracy changes. Graph 2 indicates a 
positive relationship in the Kyrgyz case, where the share of public spending allocated on education 
increases with democracy, while the scarce data in Belarus suggests a negative slope when 
democracy decreases. This on the other hand is in line with previous predictions.  
There is a positive relationship between the level of democracy and health care spending, but no 
significant impact on health care spending with a change in democracy. The case study implies a 
slight positive relationship in both cases between health care spending and democracy. The results 
for Belarus and the Kyrgyz Republic are weak, but still display a positive relationship, indicating that 
in these cases an increase in democracy increases spending on health care, in line with the argument 
that democracies favour the majority. This might partly be explained by the changed health care 
systems where Belarus’ share of private health care has increased while the Kyrgyz Republic displays 
the opposite trend with a higher share of public health care during the studied period (Appendix 5). 
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Contradicting the predictions both the regression results and the case study show a positive 
relationship between military spending and democracy, though the Kyrgyz case is hard to interpret 
due to scarce data. These regression results suggest that Post-Soviet democratization leads to higher 
military spending. Since the results are not compatible with previous studies, a conclusion is that the 
findings in this study could be explained by the regional context. One reason could be that 
autocracies to a greater extent have a close relationship to the Russian Federation and therefore do 
not have to rearm and spend as much on military. Another explanation could be that some of the 
democracies are in conflict either internally or with neighbouring countries and thus have a higher 
military spending. There is also the problem that data is lacking for some of the most autocratic 
regimes in the sample and that governments do not always report credible figures of their military 
accounts. 
6. Conclusion 
The degree of democracy affects the welfare of a country by enhancing the population’s ability to 
impact the government’s priorities. A government in a country with a higher degree of democracy is 
expected to prioritize the majority of the population to a higher extent than autocracies, through for 
example spending on education and health care. By performing a cross-country quantitative study 
the effect of degree of democracy on public spending has been studied in the Post-Soviet context. To 
complement these findings, a case study on Belarus and the Kyrgyz Republic has been conducted to 
study the short-run variation when a major democratic shift occurs. Due to limited similar studies on 
the Post-Soviet region, this study contributes with new understanding to the current knowledge gap. 
To conclude, this study finds a positive relationship between the variation in degree of democracy 
and public and military spending both in the longer perspective and in the studied short-run cases, 
where the degree of democracy has shifted. Thus can variations in public spending and military 
spending be explained by changes in a country’s degree of democracy in the Post-Soviet region. The 
insignificant results on educational and health care spending implies that a change in degree of 
democracy does not affect the share of public spending spent on human capital, although the 
absolute numbers spent on these components are higher in democracies. 
This study has focused on the variation in public spending, but does not consider the actual quality of 
the output delivered. Therefore, a study on the variation in quality of public outputs could further 
contribute to the understanding. Also, since weak democracies often deliver scarce data, it would be 
interesting to conduct a similar study in the future when possibly more data is available to further 
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test these results. Other entries for similar studies could be to study other components in the 
composition of public spending or break down the democracy measure and determine which factors 
have the greatest impact on public spending. It could also be interesting to investigate whether there 
is a larger change or impact in the earlier or later period following the Soviet period by breaking 
down the results into different time sections. This as the conditions have changed, both the global 
environment and the domestic economic set up.  
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Appendix 1: Overview of Measurements 
Variable Definition Source 
Public spending Cash payments for operating activities of the 
government in providing goods and services. It 
includes compensation of employees (such as wages 
and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social 
benefits, and other expenses such as rent and 
dividends. 
The World Bank 
Educational 
spending 
Total public expenditure (current and capital) on 
education expressed as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in a given year. Public 
expenditure on education includes government 
spending on educational institutions (both public and 
private), education administration, and 
transfers/subsidies for private entities 




Social health insurance funds, central and local 
government recurrent and capital spending, as well 
as external borrowing and grants related to the 
health system. 
WHO 
Military spending Current and capital expenditures on the armed 
forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense 
ministries and other government agencies engaged in 
defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are 
judged to be trained and equipped for military 
operations; and military space activities. Such 
expenditures include military and civil personnel, 
including retirement pensions of military personnel 
and social services for personnel; operation and 
maintenance; procurement; military research and 
development; and military aid (in the military 
expenditures of the donor country). 
The World Bank 
(SIPRI) 
Democracy Competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness 
of executive recruitment, constrains on chief 
executive, regulation of participation and 
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Appendix 2: Public Health Care Expenditure (per cent of total 
health care expenditure) 
 
Notes: The data is collected from the World Health Organization (2013) and measures public health care expenditures as 
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Appendix 3: Additional Regressions 
  Public spending Educational spending Health care spending Military spending 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy (t) -.030 
  
  -0.116* 
  
  0.103*** 
  




  (0.091) 
  
  (0.069) 
  
  (0.026) 
  




Democracy (t-2)    0.179 
 
    0.191 
 
    0.020 
 
    0.431**   
 
    (0.144) 
 
    (0.397) 
 
    (0.052) 
 
    (0.145)   
 
Democracy (t-3)    
 
0.043     
 
0.114     
 




    
 
(0.119)     
 
(0.322)     
 




Democracy (t-1)^2   
  
0.056*   
  
-0.034   
  
-0.011   
 




(0.028)   
  
(0.047)     
 
(0.017)   
 
  (0.083) 
Country fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 25.032*** 11.85*** 25.640*** 8.891*** 16.345*** 18.758*** 19.010*** 20.962*** 9.399*** 10.405*** 10.159*** 9.538*** 9.541*** 4.402*** 4.496*** 2.750 
  (0.619) (1.341) (1.507) (1.594) (0.491) (2.162) (1.952) (3.034) (0.192) (0.500) (0.548) (1.003) (0.563) (1.036) (0.850) (3.216) 
R-square 0.001 0.738 0.761 0.737 0.024 0.179 0.176 0.178 0.059 0.010 0.109 0.104 0.016 0.233 0.238 0.229 
N 158 147 143 154 126 126 126 126 239 239 239 239 151 151 151 151 
Notes: Lagged democracy is measured on a scale -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) based on data from the Center for Systemic Peace (2012). Public spending is measured 
as a per cent of GDP (The World Bank 2013:4), while education (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2013) health care (World Health Organization 2013) and military spending (World Bank 2013:4) 
are measured as a per cent of public spending. 
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Appendix 4: Additional Regressions including control variables 
  Public spending Educational spending Health care spending Military spending 
Model (6) (7) (8) (6) (7) (8) (6) (7) (8) (6) (7) (8) 
Democracy (t-1) 0.219* 0.272* 0.265* -0.384 -0.384 -0.296 0.044 0.024 0.022 0.616** 0.537* 0.483* 
  (0.118) (0.147) (0.144) (0.261) (0.297) (0.297) (0.059) (0.074) (0.075) (0.264) (0.292) (0.251) 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Democracy (t-1)^2   
 
0.060*   
 
-0.031   
 
-0.018   
 
0.089 
    
 
(0.029)   
 
(0.046)   
 
(0.020)   
 
(0.072) 
GDP per capita  1.781 -0.178 0.535 -13.400*** 13.319*** -13.131** 0.065 -0.917 -0.858 3.957 3.414 2.763 
(logged) (2.813) (3.290) (3.389) (4.207) (4.199) (0.4331) (0.966) (0.953) (1.020) (4.961) (0.158) (3.797) 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
GDP per capita growth -0.017 -0.000 -0.002 0.043 0.046 0.044 -0.030 0.001 -0.001 0.030 0.092 0.088 
  (0.080 (0.084) (0.081) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.076) (0.158) (0.154) 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Age dependency old   0.744 0.698   0.025 0.131   0.489** 0.522***   0.442 0.229 
    (0.532) (0.535)   (0.509) (0.555)   (0.174) (0.164)   (0.964) (0.861) 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Urban population   0.372 0.317   -0.110 -0.130   -0.111 -0.114   -0.542* -0.466 
    (-0.511) (0.497)   (0.780) (0.763)   (0.161) (0.165)   (0.304) (0.347) 
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 5.491 -19.771 -12.720 138.414*** 143.669** 142.612** 10.068 15.281 15.376 -27.438 1.859 3.319 
  (23.022) (33.922) (30.476) (37.140) (58.517) (60.913) (7.806) (13.829) (14.013) (41.347) (43.727) (43.740) 
R-square 0.736 0.742 0.748 0.452 0.452 0.421 0.172 0.167 0.176 0.235 0.257 0.291 
N 152 152 152 126 126 126 238 238 238 150 150 150 
Notes: Lagged democracy is measured on a scale -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) based on data from the Center for Systemic Peace (2012). Public spending is measured 
as a per cent of GDP (The World Bank 2013:4), while education (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2013) health care (World Health Organization 2013) and military spending (World Bank 2013:4) 
are measured as a per cent of public spending. GDP per capita is measured as the purchasing power parity (PPP) converted to international dollars, GDP per capita growth as the annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP per capita, age dependency as the population over 65 as per cent of working-age population, and urban population as the per cent of the total population living 
in urban areas (The World Bank 2013:4). 
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The choice of control variables are based on previous research as well as available data. Logged GDP 
per capita is measured in PPP dollars and controls for the level of economic development which is 
expected to be positively correlated to public spending. The annual growth rate of GDP per capita is 
also included to control for economic volatility, which might impact public spending. The old age 
dependency ratio is included as an older population is expected to demand more care and thus a 
higher public spending, especially health care spending. The percentage of the population living in 
urban areas is expected to be a good measure for industrialization and is thus also relevant to 
include. Due to limited data in the region the variables inflation and unemployment are not included, 
though they might explain part of the size and composition of public spending. 
Both GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth were expected to influence public spending though 
none of them are significant in these regressions. It is only for educational spending that a negative 
relationship is found with the logged GDP per capita. As expected does the old age dependency 
affect the size of health care spending positively, though still no correlation between degree of 
democracy and both educational and health care spending is found. It is important to note that these 
models to not attempt to fully explain the relationship between democracy and public spending and 
there might thus be other explanatory variables than these. 
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Democracy (t-1) 1.000 
   
    
  
Public spending -0.118 1.000 
  
    
  
Educational spending -0.093 0.037 1.000 
 
    
  
Health care spending 0.044 0.062 0.594 1.000 
    
  
Military spending -0.151 -0.079 -0.337 -0.487 1.000 
   
  
GDP per capita 
growth 
0.006 0.033 -0.247 -0.285 0.2194 1.000 
  
  
GDP per capita 0.260 0.031 -0.181 0.236 -0.325 0.105 1.000 
 
  
Age dependency old 0.628 -0.133 -0.262 0.069 -0.329 0.260 0.612 1.000   
Urban population 0.344 -0.005 -0.243 0.024 -0.299 0.252 0.703 0.841 1.000 
 
